class actions settlements

On Tuesday, the First Circuit issued a landmark decision on cy pres, In re Lupron Marketing. Though odd litigation decisions by the objectors led to affirmance in that case, the First Circuit (quoting CCAF's victory in Nachshin v. AOL) made clear that it had "unease" with cy pres, and set a precedent generally requiring compliance with §3.07 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. [Legal Newsline; FindLaw]

Coincidentally, the same day, the Center for Class Action Fairness filed its opening brief relating to the yet-to-be-proposed multi-million-dollar cy pres distribution in In re Baby Products, asking the Third Circuit to adopt §3.07; the district court held that the class wasn't even entitled to an opportunity to object to the as-yet-to-be-proposed recipients. Baby Products presents the additional problem of the sort of settlement where class members were artificially deterred from making claims to expand the amount available for cy pres; indeed, under the district court's order, the class counsel will walk away with over $14 million of the $35.5 million fund, and the class millions of dollars less, likely less than half of what the attorneys got.

• If you listen to one oral argument from March 27, well, I have to say that you need to listen to Paul Clement's performance in HHS v. Florida. But if you have time for a second oral argument, and you have a hankering for Third Circuit class action action, I'd be curious about your thoughts of the argument in Dewey v. Volkswagen. See also.
• Following up on our earlier post, the Third Circuit denied the motion for sanctions without comment, or permitting us to file a reply brief. (Mazie Slater had no explanation for the misquote; they used the passive voice in describing its mysterious appearance in the brief, and didn't explain how citecheckers missed it.) Having been given such carte blanche, Mazie Slater then proceeded to lie to the court about the terms of the settlement and settlement notice during the oral argument. I simply don't understand why courts aren't willing to do more to police the attorneys who appear before them. If the only consequence for inventing a citation out of whole cloth is the need to file an errata deleting an invented citation (i.e., the brief that should have been filed in the first place), what incentive does the Holmesian "bad actor" have to get the law right in the first place? After all, if there's a 5% chance that the fictionalized version will swing the case, 5% times $9 million in fees is a $450,000 incentive to lie to the court. If the bad actor isn't facing a proportionate downside, you can expect the bad actor to act badly.
• We renewed our objection in Bluetooth. Details at Point of Law.
• The Apple MagSafe settlement—$600,000 for the class, $3.1 million for the attorneys—was rubber-stamped by the district court. We plan to appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
• In the Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litigation settlement with Wal-Mart for a class of Netflix customers, the district court agreed with the settling parties that a coupon isn't a coupon if they call it a "gift card" instead, and that the restrictions on coupon settlements in the Class Action Fairness Act didn't apply, and rejected my objection. We believe this contradicts CAFA, as well as Seventh Circuit precedent, and plan to ask the Ninth Circuit to address this problem.

It had been a few years since I took a deposition, so it was refreshing to see that I wasn't as rusty as I was worried I'd be. Here's the plaintiffs' expert testifying about the value of the injunctive relief.

Q: So it is your opinion that only a trained audiologist with experience knows whether or not it is unsafe to listen to a device at a high volume level?

MR. HART: I object to the form of the question.

A: It’s my opinion that outside of those rare individuals who are able to educate themselves to such a high degree that no one would be able to determine whether the level at which they’re listening is relatively safe or relatively unsafe.

Q: So even after you’ve warned your patients, they might be listening to the Bluetooth device at unsafe levels?

A: No, because I would be able to provide them with detailed enough information to help them to use the device in a safe manner.

Q: What is that detailed information that is required for them to use the device in a safe manner?

A: The actual output level of the device in their ear at a given volume control setting, which is something that I can measure with my equipment and my -- in my clinic.

Q: And do the warnings provided in this settlement provide that detailed information?

A: To my knowledge, they don’t.

• Shareholder derivative suits present interesting conflicts of interest. The suit is purportedly brought on behalf of shareholders, but when the case settles, the corporate defendant—i.e., the plaintiff shareholders—are the ones paying the bill. Thus, if the suit does not actually extract any wealth from directors or officers for their supposed breaches of duty, shareholders are frequently worse off. This is the case in Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley, a derivative suit against Sears Holding Corp. where the alleged breach was failure to recognize the risk of Clayton Act litigation. The irony, of course, is that the actual shareholder derivative suit is far more expensive than the possibility of Clayton Act litigation. I objected; the posture is muddied by some procedural issues relating to the Seventh Circuit's intervention requirement, as you can see, but the fundamental point—shareholder derivative suits should not be permitted to be maintained when they are designed to benefit the attorneys, rather than the shareholders—remains valid, and we believe this is the first case to present this principle in the shareholder derivative context. The case is No. 10-3285, Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley (7th Cir.).
• Claims-made settlements are the successor to coupon settlements in structuring settlements to divert the lion's share of relief to the attorneys, rather than the class. The parties typically structure a claims process that will reward less than a tenth of the class (in this case, less than 3% of the class), hide the claims rate from the lower court by scheduling the fairness hearing well before the claims deadline (though that evasion didn't happen in this case), and then ask for attorneys' fees on the illusion that the entire class got relief. Thus, we have cases like Brazil v. Dell, where the class got less than $500,000, but the attorneys received $7 million. We think that is per se unfair, and have asked the Ninth Circuit to weigh in. The case is No. 11-17799, Brazil v. Dell (9th Cir.).

Wednesday, we filed our Second Circuit brief in Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.

• Appellees are filing response briefs in Cobell v. Salazar today. We'll put them up in our Cobell appeal update post when they make it onto the web. Oral argument is scheduled for February 16. If you're going to be in the DC area at the beginning of February, and I know you personally, let me know if you're interested in attending a moot.
• The district court approved the settlement in Barber Auto Sales v. UPS. I'm unhappy with the ruling, which I think is very wrong, but the case is both too small and too narrow to be worth appealing; we already have the larger Sirius case and pending HP Inkjet case in appellate courts to raise the Class Action Fairness Act issues that would have been central to this case. Devoting resources to appealing this case would preclude us from objecting in a couple of other cases, and stretch us pretty thin with the existing appellate schedule. Can't win 'em all, even if we only bring cases that should be won.
• The district court approved the settlement and the fee request in Trombley v. National City Bank. If it's not an abuse of discretion to approve a 28% fee and $3000/hour-of-paralegal recovery when a case settles without any risk on Docket Entry No. 5, it never is, so we're thinking long and hard about whether to appeal this one; one objector has already appealed, so our appeal wouldn't have any effect on when payouts occurred.
• The appalling refusal of Missouri appellate courts to do anything about the coupon settlement ripoff in Bachman v. AG Edwards earlier this year resulted in that state receiving attention in the annual Judicial Hellholes report earlier this week.
• It's not all bad news. Yesterday was the hearing in the second Classmates.com settlement. The parties agreed to modify the settlement to remove the Bluetooth kicker, and the court indicated it would reduce the $1.05M fee request, meaning that money will go to the class. The fee reduction alone might outstrip the original $117,000 settlement, which is now worth over $2.5M. If you're keeping track, that's the fifth time in a row we've won a case and/or fee reduction against Kabateck Brown Kellner; one hopes that this discourages them from continuing to bring bad class actions just to negotiate self-serving settlements. This time, they refrained from abusive ad hominem attacks against us in their briefs; they're learning.

Yes, we know about the Ticketmaster class action settlement, which over a dozen class members have emailed us about. There's no question that this coupon settlement (complete with questionable cy pres) would be illegal in federal court. Unfortunately, the case is pending in California state court. This limits the precedential value of the case (it's only a jurisdictional accident that it's not in federal court; if it were brought today it would be), and I'm sufficiently discouraged by the last few ventures into state court that I'm reluctant to devote limited resources to it. Including objections and a notice of appeal we've committed to file but haven't yet, we have nineteen cases pending, including eight appeals where the briefing isn't finished.

However, many of the class action settlement members who have written us are attorneys. So a possibility is that sufficiently angry attorney class members volunteer to write the briefs (working off of briefs we've previously filed on these issues). Then someone based in California (or me) could attend the fairness hearing. Other class members could submit their objections saying they're joining that one. We're going to try to coordinate that over the course of this month; if you've written to me, and I haven't emailed you yet on this, I will this weekend.

• Kimberly Craven objection
• Craven Opposition to Final Approval (stricken by court)
• Fairness Hearing Transcript (pp. 70-82)
• No. 11-5205 Amended Statement of Issues
• No. 11-5205 Certificate of Parties, Rulings, and Related Cases

Update, September 1: The plaintiffs moved for an $8.3 million appeal bond to create a procedural barrier to prevent Ms. Craven from exercising her appellate rights. Unfortunately for them, such an excessive appeal bond is illegal. Their motion inexplicably failed to cite binding precedent and court rules that contradicted their position, and we have requested sanctions.

• Craven Opposition to Motion for Appeal Bond
• Frank Declaration in Opposition to Motion for Appeal Bond

• September 6 FRAP 30 letter from Frank to opposing counsel

Update, September 9: The indiantrust.com website has been updated with the plaintiffs' September 7 reply brief on the appeal bond briefing, but omits any link to Ms. Craven's response brief.

Update, September 14: We've reached an agreement with the appellees to expedite the briefing schedule for the appeal. Ms. Craven's opening brief will be due October 17; the appellees' response briefs will be due December 16; our reply brief will be due January 6. This will, one hopes, shave several months off the time for resolution of the appeal. The D.C. Circuit has agreed to this schedule. Coverage at BLT.

Update, October 6: class counsel's motion for appeal bond denied. Class counsel is ordered to produce a declaration explaining how its brief failed to cite binding precedent and misrepresented the law. Let's see how long it takes to get the district court opinion on the indiantrust.com website.

Update, October 17: Craven's opening brief was filed today. The appellees' briefs are due December 16. I expect some amicus briefs to be filed October 24.

Update, October 26: The Competitive Enterprise Institute filed an amicus brief this week in support of Ms. Craven's appeal. More coverage at BLT.

Update, December 1: We've moved for judicial notice of a government motion to dismiss a $400 million lawsuit over Indian trust mismanagement based on the Cobell settlement. The existence of this motion supports our argument that the class certification of (and settlement distribution for) the Trust Administration class was illegal. The indiantrust.com website took down all the briefing for the appeal bond issue rather than acknowledge the district court's ruling denying the bond and criticizing their briefing strategy, so this appears to be the first appearance of the affidavit required by the court that class counsel was required to file in November. The indiantrust.com website also fails to identify that the briefing schedule for the 11-5270 appeals has not been set yet; the settling parties have requested that that be expedited to conclude in March, well after Ms. Craven's appeal briefing concludes. Finally, the DC Circuit granted CEI's leave to file an amicus brief.

Update, December 15:

• Oral argument is scheduled for February 16, with a panel of Rogers/Tatel/Brown. 
• Plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to judicial notice.
• Monday, the government has filed a brief in Two Shields v. United States that essentially argues that class certification of the Trust Administration Class under Rule 23 was illegal for the same reasons we argued that it was illegal. We've made a second motion for judicial notice of that filing. That brief contradicts the position that the government took at the fairness hearing, so I'm curious to see what they do when they file their briefs tomorrow. Certainly, however, the Two Shields case demonstrates that this illegal settlement adversely affects more than just Kimberly Craven.