class actions settlements

Wednesday, we filed our Second Circuit brief in Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.

• Appellees are filing response briefs in Cobell v. Salazar today. We'll put them up in our Cobell appeal update post when they make it onto the web. Oral argument is scheduled for February 16. If you're going to be in the DC area at the beginning of February, and I know you personally, let me know if you're interested in attending a moot.
• The district court approved the settlement in Barber Auto Sales v. UPS. I'm unhappy with the ruling, which I think is very wrong, but the case is both too small and too narrow to be worth appealing; we already have the larger Sirius case and pending HP Inkjet case in appellate courts to raise the Class Action Fairness Act issues that would have been central to this case. Devoting resources to appealing this case would preclude us from objecting in a couple of other cases, and stretch us pretty thin with the existing appellate schedule. Can't win 'em all, even if we only bring cases that should be won.
• The district court approved the settlement and the fee request in Trombley v. National City Bank. If it's not an abuse of discretion to approve a 28% fee and $3000/hour-of-paralegal recovery when a case settles without any risk on Docket Entry No. 5, it never is, so we're thinking long and hard about whether to appeal this one; one objector has already appealed, so our appeal wouldn't have any effect on when payouts occurred.
• The appalling refusal of Missouri appellate courts to do anything about the coupon settlement ripoff in Bachman v. AG Edwards earlier this year resulted in that state receiving attention in the annual Judicial Hellholes report earlier this week.
• It's not all bad news. Yesterday was the hearing in the second Classmates.com settlement. The parties agreed to modify the settlement to remove the Bluetooth kicker, and the court indicated it would reduce the $1.05M fee request, meaning that money will go to the class. The fee reduction alone might outstrip the original $117,000 settlement, which is now worth over $2.5M. If you're keeping track, that's the fifth time in a row we've won a case and/or fee reduction against Kabateck Brown Kellner; one hopes that this discourages them from continuing to bring bad class actions just to negotiate self-serving settlements. This time, they refrained from abusive ad hominem attacks against us in their briefs; they're learning.

Yes, we know about the Ticketmaster class action settlement, which over a dozen class members have emailed us about. There's no question that this coupon settlement (complete with questionable cy pres) would be illegal in federal court. Unfortunately, the case is pending in California state court. This limits the precedential value of the case (it's only a jurisdictional accident that it's not in federal court; if it were brought today it would be), and I'm sufficiently discouraged by the last few ventures into state court that I'm reluctant to devote limited resources to it. Including objections and a notice of appeal we've committed to file but haven't yet, we have nineteen cases pending, including eight appeals where the briefing isn't finished.

However, many of the class action settlement members who have written us are attorneys. So a possibility is that sufficiently angry attorney class members volunteer to write the briefs (working off of briefs we've previously filed on these issues). Then someone based in California (or me) could attend the fairness hearing. Other class members could submit their objections saying they're joining that one. We're going to try to coordinate that over the course of this month; if you've written to me, and I haven't emailed you yet on this, I will this weekend.

• Kimberly Craven objection
• Craven Opposition to Final Approval (stricken by court)
• Fairness Hearing Transcript (pp. 70-82)
• No. 11-5205 Amended Statement of Issues
• No. 11-5205 Certificate of Parties, Rulings, and Related Cases

Update, September 1: The plaintiffs moved for an $8.3 million appeal bond to create a procedural barrier to prevent Ms. Craven from exercising her appellate rights. Unfortunately for them, such an excessive appeal bond is illegal. Their motion inexplicably failed to cite binding precedent and court rules that contradicted their position, and we have requested sanctions.

• Craven Opposition to Motion for Appeal Bond
• Frank Declaration in Opposition to Motion for Appeal Bond

• September 6 FRAP 30 letter from Frank to opposing counsel

Update, September 9: The indiantrust.com website has been updated with the plaintiffs' September 7 reply brief on the appeal bond briefing, but omits any link to Ms. Craven's response brief.

Update, September 14: We've reached an agreement with the appellees to expedite the briefing schedule for the appeal. Ms. Craven's opening brief will be due October 17; the appellees' response briefs will be due December 16; our reply brief will be due January 6. This will, one hopes, shave several months off the time for resolution of the appeal. The D.C. Circuit has agreed to this schedule. Coverage at BLT.

Update, October 6: class counsel's motion for appeal bond denied. Class counsel is ordered to produce a declaration explaining how its brief failed to cite binding precedent and misrepresented the law. Let's see how long it takes to get the district court opinion on the indiantrust.com website.

Update, October 17: Craven's opening brief was filed today. The appellees' briefs are due December 16. I expect some amicus briefs to be filed October 24.

Update, October 26: The Competitive Enterprise Institute filed an amicus brief this week in support of Ms. Craven's appeal. More coverage at BLT.

Update, December 1: We've moved for judicial notice of a government motion to dismiss a $400 million lawsuit over Indian trust mismanagement based on the Cobell settlement. The existence of this motion supports our argument that the class certification of (and settlement distribution for) the Trust Administration class was illegal. The indiantrust.com website took down all the briefing for the appeal bond issue rather than acknowledge the district court's ruling denying the bond and criticizing their briefing strategy, so this appears to be the first appearance of the affidavit required by the court that class counsel was required to file in November. The indiantrust.com website also fails to identify that the briefing schedule for the 11-5270 appeals has not been set yet; the settling parties have requested that that be expedited to conclude in March, well after Ms. Craven's appeal briefing concludes. Finally, the DC Circuit granted CEI's leave to file an amicus brief.

Update, December 15:

• Oral argument is scheduled for February 16, with a panel of Rogers/Tatel/Brown. 
• Plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to judicial notice.
• Monday, the government has filed a brief in Two Shields v. United States that essentially argues that class certification of the Trust Administration Class under Rule 23 was illegal for the same reasons we argued that it was illegal. We've made a second motion for judicial notice of that filing. That brief contradicts the position that the government took at the fairness hearing, so I'm curious to see what they do when they file their briefs tomorrow. Certainly, however, the Two Shields case demonstrates that this illegal settlement adversely affects more than just Kimberly Craven.

More coverage of the AOL victory in a Washington Examiner op-ed. And Reuters Legal does a lengthy story.

AOL's attorney's comment is revealing: all they cared about was whether they were able to get rid of the frivolous claims against them in a nuisance lawsuit. But the Center cares more about establishing precedents and rules governing the long-term fairness of class actions than any individual result. That larger issue was irrelevant to AOL, so they think they have a victory, but we do, too. Reuters, through Professor Brian Fitzpatrick, questions whether it makes a difference: it does. Class actions are supposed to benefit the class first, rather than the attorneys. When the attorneys have carte blanche to choose cy pres recipients, they effectively get double-payment. To the extent Professor Fitzpatrick cares about defendant deterrence as a reason for class actions, he should be pleased that the defendant would not be allowed to dictate illusory cy pres that goes to their preferred charitable donee.

Interestingly, Kabateck Brown Kellner, whose attorneys had written a dishonest op-ed criticizing CCAF's defense of class members in cy pres settlements without revealing they were adverse to us in four cases (all four of which have now resulted in CCAF court victories), couldn't even be bothered to file a Ninth Circuit brief making a public-policy argument for their preferred tactic of abusive cy pres.

• Coverage of Monday's Nachsin v. AOL cy pres victory for CCAF, some of which is even accurate. I was also interviewed by Reuters and the Daily Journal, but I don't see their stories yet. [Zywicki @ Volokh; Fisher @ Forbes; BLD; law.com; Metropolitan News-Enterprise; Litigation Daily ($); Law360 ($); Wolfman]
• In Blessing v. Sirius XM, Judge Baer denied the request for a punitive appeal bond. Thanks to Adam Schulman, who took the lead in drafting the successful opposition brief.
• The Dewey v. VW oral argument in the Third Circuit looks like it will be scheduled in late March.
• We filed our objection to the fee request and structure in the second Classmates settlement. Dan Greenberg will argue at the fairness hearing December 15.
• Yes, that Apple Magsafe class action settlement you've gotten an email for is likely unfair given the artificial restrictions on the claims process. We have one class member as a client, perhaps two.

Welcome to those of you who found this page after reading the Wall Street Journal profile. The Journal also discussed our Sirius XM objection. Other articles about CCAF can be found on my personal website. Join our Facebook page to stay updated on what we're up to. (Later today, I'll be posting our Ninth Circuit brief on the HP Inkjet printer coupon settlement, where the attorneys got $2.1 million, and the class got coupons only usable at HP.com—which charges far more than other Internet vendors, making it more expensive to use the coupons than not to use the coupons.)

I should note the story does not give enough credit to the attorneys working with me; for example, Frank Bednarz (now a much better-paid patent litigator in BigLaw) argued the Honda case, and Dan Greenberg argued the West Publishing, Kellogg, and Hertz cases. Adam Schulman, a 2010 Georgetown Law grad, just got his first district-court argument a month ago in the Pampers case, which, after a district-court approval, will generate an interesting Sixth Circuit appeal on the scope of Rule 23(b)(2) and the permissibility of big attorney-fee awards in $0 settlements.

The Center for Class Action Fairness, founded in 2009, is a not-for-profit program that provides pro bono representation to consumers and shareholders aggrieved by class action attorneys who negotiate settlements that benefit themselves at the expense of their putative clients. It has won millions of dollars for class members over the last two years.

CCAF, a non-profit project unaffiliated with and unsupported by any corporate funding, does not lobby. But the LA Daily Journal says that they don't need to run a correction for a sentence beginning with the phrase "Corporate lobbyists and advocacy groups such as CCAF" because, according to them, they're not claiming that CCAF is a lobbyist. It seems to me that the only people who could make that sort of sophistic argument are convicted child molesters and editors such as David Houston of the Los Angeles Daily Journal.

The LA Daily Journal op-ed critical of CCAF was written by a Kabateck Brown Kellner attorney; at no point does it disclose that we've objected to four of Kabateck's settlements (all of which paid substantially more to the attorneys than the class), resulting in one settlement rejection and another ruling reducing their fee request by nearly a million dollars, with two other cases still pending.

The Center for Class Action Fairness LLC objected today to a valueless class action settlement: the objection, filed in the Southern District of New York on behalf of a class member, underscores that the proposed Sirius XM Radio settlement would provide valueless injunctive relief to the class but $13 million to class attorneys.
"Certainly, parties to a class action can agree to settle a case for $13 million," said Ted Frank, the lead attorney on the objection and the founder of CCAF. "But if they do, it is inherently unfair and unreasonable for the attorneys to extract 100% of the settlement benefit for themselves. Class actions should be prosecuted on behalf of the class members, not self-serving class counsel."

The settlement of the antitrust class action against Sirius XM requires only that the defendant agree to not raise prices for five months. But this is an entirely valueless promise, given that Sirius XM, facing admittedly heavy competition from Internet music services and MP3 players, has been lowering prices and engaging in deep discounting to keep customers. Yet class counsel (including the Milberg law firm) implausibly claims that the settlement is worth $180 million to the class.

The CCAF objection also targets Judge Harold Baer's class certification order. For several years, Judge Baer has controversially required class counsel to meet racial quotas as a condition of appointment. CCAF has requested that Judge Baer vacate that part of his class certification order as unconstitutional.

The case is Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09-cv-10035 (S.D.N.Y.).

The Center for Class Action Fairness, founded in 2009, is a not-for-profit program that provides pro bono representation to consumers and shareholders aggrieved by class action attorneys who negotiate settlements that benefit themselves at the expense of their putative clients. It has won millions of dollars for class members over the last two years.

The growth of the Center for Class Action Fairness LLC can be shown just by the breadth of its activities on Monday, June 20:

• There were twelve objectors at the Cobell v. Salazar fairness hearing, and I was the only attorney representing an objector. Unfortunately, the district court overruled our objections, and approved the $3.4 billion settlement. There was some good news: if one takes the plaintiffs' request for $224 million in a fee and expense award seriously, rather than as a tactical maneuver to give the judge room to award high fees while appearing to cut the request, then the judge's decision to award $99 million in fees (and reject another $11 million in expense requests by the class representatives) means that there will be another $136 million available for class members when and if distribution takes place.
• Dan Greenberg was at the fairness hearing in the Central District of California for Stetson v. West Publishing which drew some extra blogosphere attention because it involved BarBri expenses for many many recent law-school graduates. The court, from the bench, rejected the coupon settlement, which entailed over $1.8 million in attorney-fee requests. It's the second win from the bench in a row for Dan; we're still waiting for the official opinion in the coupon settlement rejection in Sobel v. Hertz (D. Nev.).
• And Adam Schulman, our local counsel Chris Arfaa, and I helped file Dan's reply brief in the McDonough v. Toys "R" Us (E.D. Pa.) baby products class action settlement, where the attorneys are requesting about $14 million though the class is likely to receive less than $20 million. The fairness hearing will be July 6 in Philadelphia.

The Center for Class Action Fairness represents class members pro bono when they are treated unfairly by class action settlements. Please contact me if you get notice of a class action settlement that you are concerned might be unfair, and I will evaluate it for free.

In 2009, the state of Oregon complained to Kellogg that they said Rice Krispies and Cocoa Krispies were fortified with antioxidants, and Kellogg changed the description of the boxes of the cereal—though the cereal is fortified with antioxidants. Almost immediately, several plaintiffs' lawyers filed lawsuits on the basis of Kellogg's announcement, and after several amended complaints, Kellogg's agreed to a nuisance settlement of $2.5 million. Class members can request $5 refunds for up to three boxes of cereal purchased between June 1, 2009 and March 1, 2010, an amount that will be reduced pro rata if the settlement money runs out, though one might expect that there will only be a few thousand claims. Though the class is nationwide, Kellogg is giving another $2.5 million (retail value, so it's really costing them half as much) in food to two local charities in Santa Monica and Atlanta. The class representatives will seek $5000 each.
How much are the attorneys asking for? I don't know: it's not in the notice or settlement agreement, but it comes out of the $2.5 million settlement fund. (The attorneys will announce on July 18; objections must be received by July 25—a Monday. This abbreviated and substandard notice is arguably a violation of Rule 23(h) and Ninth Circuit procedure in In re Mercury Securities Litig.. The notice is otherwise substandard, as there are several hoops one must jump through to object that are not listed in the notice.) Anything left over after the class is paid will go to the two local charities and a trial-lawyer group.

Details at the Point of Law blog. I'm sorry, as well as angry.

Update: I won't be filing an appeal, though my clients are of course free to find an attorney willing to do that for them.

I won't personally be filing a malpractice action, but I'm happy to consult with an attorney who is considering doing so if a class member finds one.

Update 2: Please don't email me asking for individual legal advice about what you can or should do with your computer, or what other legal options you may pursue. I don't have the resources to provide free advice to a million different class members beyond my five clients. You'll need to consult with your own attorney. I'm rooting for someone to bring a malpractice suit, but I'm not advising you one way or the other on that, either as a class action or as a small-claims case against Milberg.

I will note that I believe that, because NVIDIA failed to provide a computer of "like or similar kind" as the settlement notice promised, and because Judge Ware failed to enforce the settlement as written and noticed to the class (his opinion mistakenly says that the CQ-56 was "designated in the settlement"), the class notice is constitutionally invalid and cannot be considered to bind absent class members besides my five clients who got a ruling from Judge Ware. Someone who sues HP and/or NVIDIA in small-claims court and persuades the judge that the class notice does not bind them could possibly recover cash in small-claims court. Of course, HP and NVIDIA will argue that the notice was constitutionally valid and that the small-claims court does not have jurisdiction, so I am not giving you legal advice to pursue your claim in small-claims court; you could win, you could lose. Check with a lawyer.

In these two California class action settlements over debt-collection practices, one strongly suspects the attorneys are trying to rip off their clients: notwithstanding the clear requirement of Rule 23(h) and In re Mercury Interactive Securities Lit., notice is going to the class without any disclosure of the requested attorneys' fees. But in Calloway v. Cash America Net of California LLC, No. 09-CV-4858, 2011 WL 1467356 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2011), the Court ruled that the fact that the attorneys' fees were being paid separately from a common fund meant that the class would not be affected by the fee award. This is economic nonsense: the fact that a denial of a fee request will revert to the defendant instead of the plaintiff is reason to give a settlement more rather than less scrutiny. And, indeed, the settlements in these cases pay a grand total of $212,500 to class members (compared to $6,000 for the two class representatives), a tiny fraction of the statutory damages available. So how can a court say that attorneys who settle for pennies on the dollar for their clients but reserve the right for a full fee award by insisting an admission from the defendant that the plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" aren't potentially depriving the class? Imagine a hypothetical settlement where every class member gets a penny but the attorneys ask for a multiplied lodestar and get clear sailing: by Judge Seeborg's reasoning, class members have no complaint because the fees aren't coming from the class's pockets. But class members do have a complaint when attorneys settle class actions with self-serving agreements that benefit the attorneys at the expense of the class: that prevailing-party clause surely comes at a cost to class recovery.

If there's a member of one of these two classes who would like to timely object to this potential rip-off, the Center would be happy to represent them pro bono to vindicate the protections of Rule 23(h) in all class settlements. The second case is Gittin v. KCI USA, Inc., No. C-09-5843 RS (N.D. Cal.).

Today the Center for Class Action Fairness filed an objection to the $3.4 billion taxpayer-funded Cobell Indian trust settlement on behalf of Sisseton-Wahpeton Ovate tribe member and class member Kimberly Craven.

Congress recently held hearings in response to the class attorneys' fee request of $223 million, which was over twice the $99.9 million they promised Congress they would limit their request to. [BLT]

The fee request includes one $925/hour attorney who claims to have billed over 28,000 hours in seven years, including a 28.5-hour day. The class representatives have also requested an unprecedented $13 million payment for themselves, raising conflict-of-interest questions that could preclude settlement approval.

Ms. Craven's objection, among other issues, challenges the "upside-down" allocation methodology, where class members who have suffered the most mismanagement of their trust accounts will receive less money than equally situated class members whose trust accounts were administered appropriately.

The settlement and objection present interesting legal issues of whether Congress can constitutionally abrogate class action certification requirements and whether a mandatory class action for injunctive relief can involuntarily waive class members' rights to relief already won in court in exchange for one-size-fits-all cash payments.

The case is Cobell v. Salazar, No. 1:96-cv-1285 (TFH) (D.D.C.).

A class action against Babies "R" Us and manufacturers of upscale baby products—BabyBjorns, Britax car seats, Kids Line and Peg Perego products, Maclaren strollers, Medela breast pumps—over allegedly anticompetitive vertical price restraints has resulted in a $35.24 million settlement after the district court certified a class of consumers who purchased particular products from Toys "R" Us or Babies "R" Us since 1999 (and, occasionally, shorter time windows).

But the attorneys reserve themselves the right to ask for one third of that amount plus "expenses" plus fees for administering the settlement; the notice provides no upward bound for that amount, so for all we know class counsel (including Spector Roseman and Hagens Berman) will be asking for a majority of the fund. And notice and administration expenses come from the settlement fund, so the attorneys are seeking a commission on the notice. There is a cy pres provision entitling moneys to be used for third-party charities that the class counsel and defendants like; the notice provides no information who those third-party charities are. Because the class counsel is also seeking a third of those moneys, they have no incentive to ensure the money goes to their clients rather than to the charities that they themselves have selected. The settlement itself has a "clear sailing" agreement (¶ 26) prohibiting the defendants from challenging the fee request, so unless there are objectors, the court will be faced with an ex parte request for this skimming of millions of dollars that should be going to the class. There's also a quickpay provision: the attorneys' fees are paid immediately, but there's no obligation for the settlement fund to ever disburse to the class members. But who has the incentive to hire an expensive attorney to object?

We recently had two victories in two cases in front of the same judge; the question then becomes whether to submit a fee request. There's good precedent for us asking for fees in both cases on the theory that the objection "improved the process," but we take the position that class attorneys should only recover fees rationally related to the size of the class benefit achieved, so, to remain cleaner than Caesar's wife, we only ask for fees when we actually achieve a pecuniary benefit for the class, and our fee request is always on a percentage basis of the benefit. (Moreover, we only accept fees that are court-ordered, and we do not "settle" our objections unless the settlement results in a fix of the issues we objected to, i.e., we don't make quid quo pro extortionate objections for settlement money.)

A lodestar calculation is a bad idea for objections, because it encourages technical objections that don't benefit the class, and encourages wasteful litigation over fishing-expedition discovery. It's too easy to manipulate lodestar: we see this often in the class action context, where lots of low-paid temp attorneys request and review millions of pointless documents and then get "billed" at over $300/hour. Nor is it a good use of court resources to scrutinize the hourly bills for waste and duplication (which is bound to happen given the number of cases unnecessarily involving multiple law firms). The right way, and most efficient way, to align incentives is, in my view, a reasonable percentage of the recovery.

So, in one case, our only accomplishment was to reduce the exorbitant fee request; we didn't ask for fees for ourselves because the class didn't see a penny of that reduction (though a for-profit objector did request fees, as was their right). In the other case, the parties responded to our objection by modifying the settlement to partially address our concerns, and, as a result, the class received an additional $2.5 million in recovery that would have otherwise instead gone to unrelated third parties (including two schools affiliated with lead class counsel).

A year ago I said we wouldn't seek more than 4.4% in a fee request, but that was when we consisted of one attorney and one part-time volunteer; I was indifferent if we were short on cash flow in any given month, because I live a frugal life and could support myself out of my own savings and occasional poker-playing Las Vegas trips if I had to (as I did for several months). Now that I have other attorneys doing work for CCAF who do depend on CCAF for an embarrassingly below-market income, and who would suffer financially if we ever ran out of money; and now that I find CCAF having to turn down legitimate cases because of lack of resources, I'm hurting my cause by being so noble-minded. And because we only ask for fees to be deducted from class counsel's fee request, the only beneficiary of that noble-mindedness are the trial lawyers who were happy to shortchange their putative clients to begin with.

In the case where we won $2.5 million, the plaintiffs' attorneys made lots of frivolous arguments and filings that raised our costs and time-commitment substantially, and created risk that we wouldn't get any fees at all. We would have been willing to stipulate for a joint application for 3.5% of what we had won, but the plaintiffs' attorneys, embarrassed by our success, insisted on scorched-earth litigation tactics instead (including the standard offensive ad hominem name-calling), so, given the increased risk we were facing, and the increased hassle of having to collaterally litigate attorneys' fees instead of other class action settlements, we saw no reason not to request the full extent of what the law permits—a proportionate share of attorneys' fees, reflecting our contribution to the class recovery. 15% of the class recovery was directly attributable to our objection: why shouldn't we get 15% of the total amount of attorneys' fees? In this case, it works out to an 11.9% contingent-fee request, still well under the 25% benchmark for settlements of this size or the 35%+expenses we see some class attorneys abusively request.

Nevertheless, we operate largely on the basis of the generosity of our donors. If you gave us money between May 30 and today because you thought we were only going to ask for 4.4% of attorneys' fees, and do not believe you have gotten fair charitable value from your donation or are otherwise offended by our fee request, let me know, and we can discuss a refund or a modification of our request.

Class members getting a notice for this case have been writing me. Dudes: I made my name in the Grand Theft Auto class action, of course I bought Madden and am a class member here.

This is a class action certification, rather than a settlement, so there isn't an easy way for me to get involved at this stage. At the moment, the problem is one of antitrust law, rather than class action law: as the defendant, Electronic Arts already has every incentive to litigate for a reasonable interpretation of antitrust law (and, more particularly, law geeks, the Aspen Skiing or bottleneck doctrine) without me butting in. Given my limited resources and heavy caseload (five cases have filings due in the next seven days!), I prefer to save my powder for cases—like class action settlements—where none of the parties before the court have the proper incentive to ensure the right questions get before the court unless I speak up. I would like to see more courts consider Rule 23(a)(4) in antitrust cases, since many class actions involve legal theories that would make the putative clients/consumers worse off, and a class certification is effectively a merits decision that a class member would prefer to endorse the class attorney's theory of the case. And some day in some case where the conflict is clearer and the defendant hasn't alienated me with poor customer service and buggy products, I'll make that argument. But given that courts have never considered this question before, I want the first time I make the argument to be a better test case than this one.

Rest assured, however, that I'm monitoring the case, and will not hesitate to get involved if class counsel tries to pull a fast one on their clients. (I'm naively hoping that, if I'm doing my job right, my vocal presence in the class will deter class counsel from negotiating a settlement I would object to in the first place.) If you're asking me what you should do, I can't give you individual legal advice if we don't have an attorney-client relationship, but I would note that there is no reason to ever opt out of a class action unless you plan to be suing the defendant yourself. If you're still in the class when it settles, you can always object later if the lawyers turn out to be settling the case for their benefit rather than yours.

The case number is 08-cv-2820-CW (N.D. Cal.).

In January, we discussed a Center for Class Action Fairness objection to a coupon settlement involving HP inkjet printers. That settlement turned out to be even worse than the pathetic one advertised: $5 million in coupons were offered, but the multi-million member class only bothered to file claims for $1.5 million worth of the coupons, with the rest reverting to HP. And of course, a claim for a coupon is not an actual redemption of the coupon: my $2 coupon will likely go unused, since there's nothing HP sells on its website that isn't more than two dollars more expensive than what I can get it for elsewhere.

The attorneys asked for $2.9 million in fees and expenses, justifying it with a quack economic expert report valuing some token injunctive relief as being worth tens of millions of dollars. In a March 29 opinion, Judge Fogel rejected that valuation, held that the settlement was worth only $1.5 million to the class, and reduced the award of fees and expenses to $2.1 million.

Some of the language in the opinion is very good: all too often, courts divorce the fee inquiry from the relief actually won. As Russell Jackson points out, this court said, "To allow an award of attorneys' fees to outstrip the benefit to consumers in such cases would undermine the importance of focusing the efforts of class action counsel on issues that most affect consumers."

So why did the attorneys get $2.1 million? Because of the economic fiction of "fees" and "expenses," which are calculated differently. See, "expenses" cover things like travel, experts, and copying costs. But "fees," that covers things like rent and other overhead, attorney salaries, and paralegals. Attorneys will allocate a dollar received into one bucket or the other, and for some reason, courts will scrutinize the buckets differently, though at the end of the day, the attorneys get a single check for money that they can spend any way they want: the rent and the airlines are going to get paid either way. So the court held that the $2.9 million requested, consisting of $2.3 million in fees and $0.6 million in expenses, was unreasonable with respect to the fees, and reasonable with respect to the expenses—even though the fee request also includes money that goes to expenses, just a different category of expenses. So the attorneys got all of their "expense" request, and just had the "fee" request reduced—but still ended up with more than the class.

That's just business as usual, but there were a couple of other troubling things about the decision. The Class Action Fairness Act requires coupons to be valued by their redemption rate, not by the claim rate. Many of these coupons (such as the one I am scheduled to receive) are not going to be used; one institutional party received tens of thousands of unusable coupons because the terms of the settlement require a claimant to use only one coupon per order, and it would be infeasible for the company to split up its bulk orders to tens of thousands of individual orders.

Second, the court opinion says that there were only three objections, but this is false: there were hundreds of objections, but, because of a confusing notice, 99% of the objectors (including the institution discussed earlier) sent their objections to the claims administrator, the parties never passed along those objections to the court, and the court disregarded my complaint about the procedure in its opinion. Ironic for a consumer fraud case that the plaintiffs' attorneys successfully took advantage of a misleading notice they provided.

Should CCAF appeal this decision? An attorney commenting at Jackson's site suggests that the plaintiffs' attorneys will appeal, and if they do, we'll certainly cross-appeal. At some point CCAF will ask the appellate courts to create a bright-line rule forbidding attorneys from recovering more than their clients. Is this the case to do it?

As I discussed on our Facebook page yesterday, I wasn't given our full ten minutes to argue in the hearing, while Milberg and NVIDIA took well over ten minutes each to argue against the motion. This could mean Judge Ware didn't care what I had to say, or it could mean that he wanted to give the other side the chance to exhaust every argument before ruling against them, or it could mean nothing at all or anything in between. The judge acknowledged the difference between a 17-inch screen and the smaller replacement computer screen. Judge Ware said he'd review the technical reports, so it seems that it will come down to which experts he believes. Will the judge see that Nader Bagherzadeh's conclusions are dishonestly inconsistent with his own data or that Jon Peddie applied the wrong legal standard and contradicted his non-litigation positions? I don't know, and I don't know when the judge will rule. I have one case in Chicago where we've been waiting since October for a ruling, and a recent case in New Jersey where a ruling came in less than 24 hours.

Update: Court rules for NVIDIA. If you're a class member with questions about the case, and why your attorneys argued against your own recovery, you need to talk to your attorneys at Milberg; I cannot help you.

Our earlier post continues to update the docket, most notably with our reply brief filed today.

It's hard to believe that multiple millionaire lawyers from multiple law firms all asked the court to apply the wrong legal standard for deciding a dispute over a consent decree accidentally. I'll take it as a good sign that they didn't think they could win if the court applied the correct legal standard and that their only hope was to obfuscate. It is of some concern that lawyers think they can obfuscate like that and get away with it without getting sanctioned.

What is most remarkable is the shamelessness of the contrasting claims by NVIDIA and Milberg. When asking the court to disregard objections to the settlement, the settling parties argued that there would be hundreds of thousands of claims worth at least tens (and probably hundreds) of millions of dollars. (Milberg actually argued that there would be "exponentially" more than hundreds of thousands of claims, but I presume that was because they don't know what "exponentially" means rather than because they were arguing that there would be tens of billions of claims.)

But push has come to shove, and only 30 thousand class members have taken the preliminary steps of asking for relief—and the Settling Parties have the gall to argue that this response rate (which will correspond to less than $10 million of class benefit, less than the $13 million attorney fee) demonstrates the popularity of the settlement administration, because one couldn't reasonably expect any more claims than that. We didn't even ask for those numbers: NVIDIA shamelessly volunteered them as evidence of the success of the settlement.

This case is a poster child for why courts should not award attorneys' fees until after the claims period has ended. If we hadn't intervened in this case, no one would have ever disclosed that Milberg exaggerated class recovery twenty- to fifty-fold, and this would be recorded in some empirical study as evidence of attorneys generously restricting themselves to fees of less than 10% of class recovery, rather than 130% of class recovery.

Update: Court rules for NVIDIA. If you're a class member with questions about the case, and why your attorneys argued against your own recovery, you need to talk to your attorneys at Milberg; I cannot help you.

If there was ever any question of whether Milberg was going to side with its putative clients or its putative adversary, we now have an answer from this Litigation Daily story (behind a subscription wall, but now available for free):

Lead class counsel Jeff Westerman of Milberg said in a statement that Frank is "working against the interests of consumers who deserve to get their computers replaced."

"This settlement is providing class members with repairs and replacement computers, and thousands have already submitted claims," Westerman said in the statement. "When it comes to the replacement computers, we hired an independent expert who confirmed that we were adhering to the terms of the settlement. [Frank's] claims to the contrary reveal an anti-consumer agenda aimed at stopping the settlement from proceeding."

Three obvious points:

1. Millions of HP owners were subject to the settlement; "thousands have already submitted claims." Or, in other words, less than 1% of the class has submitted claims. And that's aside from the fact that "submitting a claim" doesn't indicate approval of the settlement administration, just an understanding that half a loaf is better than none. All of my clients have "submitted claims"; none are happy with the settlement.

2. In case it wasn't clear from my briefs, I fully support "consumers [getting] their computers replaced." One can readily look at my proposed order, and see that I am not trying to "stop[] the settlement from proceeding." There is already an existing court order for the settlement to proceed, and no one has moved to stay that order.

3. I've heard of spin, but it's remarkable that demanding that consumers get what their attorneys promised them in a class action settlement and notice is considered "an anti-consumer agenda." To review: it's the tort reform advocate who has filed papers with the court asking for consumers to get what they were promised; it's the trial lawyers who have announced their intent to file papers with the Court siding with the defendant and alleged wrongdoer insisting that the consumers—their clients—get less than what the Court has already ordered.

Leading tech blog Engadget caught wind of our motion:

Ted Frank of the Center for Class Action Fairness says that NVIDIA has no business passing off cheap laptops, and we think he might have a case -- after all, the judge ordered that NVIDIA provide "a replacement computer of like or similar kind and equal or similar value," and it doesn't take a lawyer to see that the $400 [sic] Compaq Presario CQ56-115DX that the company's offering doesn't come close to compensating owners of faulty machines. We joked that you might be better off selling your old laptop for parts on eBay, and that might not be far from the truth.

So did leading law blog Above the Law.

Update: Court rules for NVIDIA. If you're a class member with questions about the case, and why your attorneys argued against your own recovery, you need to talk to your attorneys at Milberg; I cannot help you.

Our January 13 post on the NVIDIA GPU settlement, where class members were promised a “replacement HP notebook computer … of similar kind and value as their eligible malfunctioning notebook computer" as part of a settlement, but are instead getting a $330 Compaq CQ56 notebook, has generated several updates and over 100 comments. Though class counsel suggested to me that patience would result in a fix to the settlement, it did not for the vast majority of aggrieved class members, and we ended up losing five weeks. I've started this post now that the court filings have started, and will update as new filings come in. The court granted our motion to expedite the hearing schedule, but expediting means a March 28 hearing. Over 100 HP owners have asked for the opportunity to provide a declaration to the court. One of my clients has a website with more information: fairnvidiasettlement.com.

• 343. HP Owners' emergency motion to shorten time
• 344. Frank declaration in support of emergency motion
• 345. Plaintiffs' status report and response to emergency motion
• 346. NVIDIA response to emergency motion (Note: NVIDIA says I was not authorized to represent their non-opposition. That's my fault: I incorrectly assumed that when Robert Varian of Orrick e-mailed me to say that there was an "Agreement not to oppose" the motion, that meant there was an agreement not to oppose the motion. Similarly, plaintiffs surprised me when they sat on my proposed schedule for over 24 hours without telling me they changed their minds not to oppose. Live and learn.)
• 347. Court order scheduling briefing and hearing
• 348. Motion to enforce settlement
• 349. Memorandum in support of motion to enforce settlement
• 349-12. Proposed order
• 350. Frank declaration in support of motion to enforce settlement
• 351. Ram/Edelson objectors kibitz on motion
• 352. Brown class members' response to Ram/Edelson objectors
• 353. [Transcript ordering relating to objectors' appeal; not relevant to this motion]
• 354. NVIDIA response to [348] motion
• 355. Jon Peddie (NVIDIA) declaration
• 356. Keith Katchor (NVIDIA) declaration
• 357. Dan Rosenthal (NVIDIA/settlement administrator) declaration
• 358. Milberg response to [348] motion
• 358.1. Westerman declaration
• 358.2. Bagherzadeh declaration
• 358.4. Laratro declaration
• 359. Certificate of service
• 360. Unrelated docket entry regarding procedural step in objector appeal
• 361. Lichterman (NVIDIA/Orrick) declaration
• 362. Reply brief in support of motion to enforce settlement
• 363. Zilles declaration
• 364. Frank supplemental declaration
• 365. Vlastone supplemental declaration and report
• 366. Notice of settling parties' alteration of settlement website
• 367. NVIDIA response to notice of settling parties' alteration of settlement website
• 368. Supplemental Bagherzadeh declaration
• 369. Supplemental Laratro declaration
• 370. Certificate of service
• 371. Supplemental Zilles declaration
• 372. Supplemental Frank declaration
• 373. Docket entry noting hearing and motion under submission
• 374. Horton declaration

You will recall that a class action is pending in Kansas over gasoline retailers' failure to disclose the laws of physics to customers, i.e., gasoline, like all other liquids, expands in higher temperatures. Since a "gallon" is a measure of volume rather than power, someone buying gasoline when it's warm is getting less mileage than someone who buys the same volume of gasoline when it's cool. To some extent, the retailers are being hoist by their own petard, because they pulled the same class action nonsense on wholesalers, but it's still socially wasteful litigation that benefits no one but the lawyers; when I argued at a fairness hearing in Kansas City last April, I had several dozen witnesses, likely each billing an average of over $400/hour. Costco decided to get the uncertainty off of its books, and agreed to pay the lawyers to go away. But the class members, the ones putatively injured by Costco's conduct, got nothing. The plaintiffs had the chutzpah to claim that Costco's agreement to "temperature-adjust" their fuel sales was a benefit to consumers, but that's clearly not so. If Costco's average "gallon" happens to increase in size a cubic inch or two, that doesn't mean that consumers are getting free gas any more than it would mean that consumers would get free eggs if the government suddenly mandated that a "dozen" was now equal to eighteen.

The court threw out the settlement on a technicality, and the parties are now back with an amended settlement that fixes the technicality, but still doesn't do anything for the class. So my clients renewed their objection to the settlement. Last time around, we challenged the quack economic report that plaintiffs submitted that claimed changing the size of a gallon would magically result in consumers getting tens of millions of dollars of free gasoline; the other side protested that I was just a mere lawyer who wasn't qualified to use big words like "cross-subsidization." Over the last few months, I've discussed this case with several economists, many of whom fell over laughing as I described the testimony of Dr. Andrew Safir; the distinguished Dr. David Henderson was kind enough to charge us a reduced rate to provide a simple rebuttal on short notice this time around.

When is injunctive relief a benefit to the class? So many plaintiffs' lawyers seem confused about this issue: they forget that they represent clients, and the injunctive relief needs to benefit their clients if one is to count it towards determining the fairness of the settlement. Few courts consider the issue because few objectors raise it, but the ones that do consider it consistently distinguish between retrospective injunctive relief (say, a recall that fixes an automobile or a computer) and prospective injunctive relief (a company agrees to change its business practices). Even when there is consumer fraud, prospective injunctive relief doesn't benefit consumers unless they engage in new business with the vendor. And even then, the consumers will not benefit if the vendor simply raises its prices to account for the new costs in the change in business practices.

I'm quoted in a Reuters story about merger lawsuits and their quick settlements:

Settlements often come fast, and plaintiffs' lawyers share in the spoils -- $500,000 in a typical lawsuit, Advisen said.

"The real problem, I think, is in cases where lawyers win a few extra sentences of disclosure and walk away with $1 million of fees," said Ted Frank, who founded the Center for Class Action Fairness and often challenges proposed
Settlements.
Lawyers and researchers say the proliferation of lawsuits reflects increased competition among firms.

"There are some bottom feeders on the plaintiffs' side," said Adam Savett, a director at the Claims Compensation Bureau LLC, which monitors Class Action claims for investors. "Their modus operandi is throw up a lot of stuff on the wall and try to get a quick Settlements, and move on."

REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS

Typically, an individual or institutional investor sues a target company or its directors, seeking Class Action status and alleging a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders.

...

"Defense lawyers benefit from this game," Travis Laster, a vice chancellor in Delaware Chancery Court, said at a December hearing. "They get to bill hours without any meaningful reputational risk from a loss. They then get to get a cheap settlement for their client. Disclosures are cheap."

Frank, of the Center for Class Action Fairness, said it was up to judges to decide if these Settlements have much benefit.

"Judges should consider whether these provisions actually create value for shareholders," he said, "or amount to a rearranging of the deck chairs to create the illusion of value to justify attorneys' fees."

Update: Court rules for NVIDIA. If you're a class member with questions about the case, and why your attorneys argued against your own recovery, you need to talk to your attorneys at Milberg; I cannot help you. Please do not contact me about this case asking how you can get your computer fixed.

In the NVIDIA GPU settlement, owners of HP notebook computers affected by a defective chip had to be thrilled: the settlement notice promised them that, with proper documentation, they would receive a “replacement HP notebook computer … of similar kind and value as their eligible malfunctioning notebook computer.” But after the settlement was approved, they learned,much to their displeasure, that their class counsel, Milberg LLP, negotiated that they could only receive an entry-level Compaq CQ50, often worth over a thousand dollars less than the computer they would be replacing. Let's hope this is an oversight, rather than a deliberate attempt to deceive the class and the court: I senta letter to the settling parties' counsel today asking for clarification.

Update, January 16: I'm getting dozens of emails from class members because of a couple of posts on HP-related message boards from class members suggesting that I be lobbied. Please understand that I am not in a position of power to unilaterally do anything about the settlement. I am an attorney who represents consumers pro bono in similar situations where attorneys try to rip off class members in settlements. I am certainly interested in this case based on what I've heard, and I am investigating at the request of a class member. I agree that the current settlement claims process is inconsistent with the notice given the class; you don't need to try to convince me of that fact. If the settling parties don't do anything to fix the problem, and can't satisfy me that they have a legal basis to do what they did, and research determines that legal intervention has a chance of fixing the matter, I'll write back a few of you to see if you can generate a signed declaration for the court proceedings to help the court understand the extent of the breach of the class counsel's promise to the class. But I amnot your attorney unless you and I agree to a signed retention agreement that I am your attorney. The fact that I wrote a letter to the class counsel about this question does not mean that you should not investigate the possibility of legal representation for yourself.

Update, January 18, 4:15 PM Eastern: I have not received anything in writing as of this afternoon. I called the Milberg firm, and they claim that the information on the website is "premature" and not the "final" version of the settlement. This is mysterious, given that Milberg has control over the website. Worse, Milberg refuses to provide anything in writing that the website will be updated with different information, so Milberg can deny that they told me this later. Still, there is a claim that there will be a "meeting" tonight to discuss modifications to the claims process. One would hope that any such modifications includes corrective notice to the class and an extended claims process to make up for the inaccurate information previously given. I will check the settlement website next week. The low level person I spoke to did not seem to understand the difference between an objection to a judge's decision and asking Milberg to comply with the judge's order, and kept asking me if I thought the judge had made a mistake. Class members thinking of writing me should instead politely call Milberg at 213.617.1200 and get an answer about whether and when the Milberg NVIDIA settlement website is up to date, and why inaccurate or "premature" information has been posted to the website. If Milberg tells you something different than they told me, leave a comment here.

Update, January 26, 7 PM Eastern: I finally spoke with Mr. Westerman at Milberg. He's asked me for more time to negotiate with NVIDIA to work through some of these issues. Depending on whether the settlement administration procedure changes, at the end of the day, we may or may not agree whether the parties are in compliance with what the settlement and the class notice promised, but I'm willing to give him the chance: my preference is for the parties to make this right without me getting involved by filing papers with the court. If I sign up clients, I will not be signing up dozens of clients: I will be working with two to five people who have very clear-cut cases where the CQ50 or the Asus EEE T101MT-EU17-BK is self-evidently to a layperson not a “replacement HP notebook computer … of similar kind and value as their eligible malfunctioning notebook computer” and ask for classwide relief; I may contact a few other class members and ask for them to provide declarations supporting the argument. That said, you should not view my participation in the case as a reason not to retain a lawyer on your own: I am not your lawyer unless we have a signed retention agreement. While I am happy to receive spec sheets describing the model of your computer and comparing it to the replacement computer, please do not contact me asking me for updates or for personalized legal advice: I will update this blog post as new information comes in; if you've read the blog post, you know everything I know and can tell you.

Update, February 1: After another conversation with Mr. Westerman today, I will reevaluate the situation on February 9.


Update, February 10. The settlement website has been finally modified: claimants deemed ineligible between January 10 and January 22 are encouraged to resubmit claims; the replacement computer remedy for HP notebook computers will be a Compaq Presario CQ56 computer, rather than a CQ50. That still doesn't address the tablet problem; leave your comments on your thoughts about the CQ56. Mr. Westerman has asked me to refrain from action this week (and, frankly, the press of other commitments in existing cases would mean that I would need to do that anyway). Please remember that I am not your attorney and cannot provide individualized advice on how to respond to the settlement, and please do not rely upon me as your only recourse; there may be other attorneys willing to look into this. In particular, I encourage you to contact the consumer division of your state attorney general's office (and city/county office as well, if you have one). I will check back in with Mr. Westerman February 15.




Update, February 16 - The settlement has been modified, though in ways that do not solve the grievances earlier discussed for most class members. A number of class members have formally retained me; we'll be filing some sort of papers with the court before the end of the month asking for the court to intervene to enforce the promises made to the class, though I'm still doing research as to what form those papers will take, and whether we're proceeding against just NVIDIA or both NVIDIA and class counsel. (NVIDIA counsel never responded to my letter.) I did not speak to Mr. Westerman on February 15, and he's in court today, but I'll try to reach him tomorrow to determine class counsel's position on our petition to the court, and whether they'll cooperate with us or oppose us. (I would view any opposition as a breach of fiduciary duty to the class.) One thing I know we'll want is declarations in support of our motion. If you're interested in submitting such a declaration (under oath, under penalty of perjury) to the court expressing your thoughts on why the computers are not of like kind and value, leave information in this thread with a way to contact you, and someone may be in touch with you next week (though we probably will not have the chance to get declarations from everyone who offers to issue one). Please continue to note: (1) if we do not have a retainer agreement, I am not your attorney in this case; (2) I cannot offer individualized advice about how to respond to the settlement; and (3) if you do submit a declaration to the court, you do so voluntarily to help the cause of your fellow HP owners: it does not make me your attorney.

Update, February 22 - One of my clients has established the website http://fairnvidiasettlement.com/ to summarize what's happening and collect potential declarations from other class members. While he is doing the declaration data collection on my behalf, he is not speaking for me, but the site is a useful compendium of information. We may end up with dozens of declarations, but I am not going to want to overwhelm the court, and will likely only use six to twelve of them. I am currently negotiating a briefing schedule with the settling parties in the hopes of getting a hearing date with the court before the claims period expires; without court approval for expedition, there wouldn't be a hearing before April.

The Ninth Circuit has scheduled oral argument in the Bluetooth case for Monday, February 7, 9 a.m., in the federal courthouse in Pasadena. (Five other cases are on the calendar, so I probably won't get my fifteen minutes until after 10 a.m.) I'm undefeated (well, ok, 1-0) in that courthouse.

The first time I ever visited the Pasadena courthouse was in the fall of 1992, when a memorable young law clerk in Alex Kozinski's chambers named Eugene Volokh quizzed me about the issue of toughening evidentiary standards for expert witnesses in what I think was the first law-clerk interview of the season for 1994-95. (That was the first attempt of the judiciary and the legal academy to create a cartel for the hiring of law clerks, and I unwittingly caused it to break down when I sent my resume out without consulting with the law school, and Judge Kozinski started calling people in for interviews, causing a chain reaction that unraveled everyone's plans.) Eugene, of course, went on to bigger and better things.

If you're in the DC area, and you're interested in putting in a few hours reading briefs and throwing questions at me on a moot court later this month, please drop me an email. (Friends from Kirkland & Ellis: sorry, you're adverse to me in this case, so you're not invited.)